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ABSTRACT and KEYWORDS  
This study examines the role of bilateral investment treaties in securing foreign investment in 
Ethiopia. Using books, journal articles, and legislation, the study has found that those bilateral 
investment treaties have a role in securing international investments for Ethiopia. It has also 
found that BITs do not only safeguard foreign investors but can also attract more investment. 
The study concludes by providing a list of recommendations, highlighting the benefits of BITs for 
Ethiopia. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Economic history demonstrates the vulnerability of foreign investors.1Treaties aimed specifically 
at protecting private foreign investment are called bilateral investment treaties.2 Bilateral 
investment treaties are legal instruments under international law between two contracting 
countries.3 They set forth standards for the management of foreign investment in areas such as 
the expropriation of property, the repatriation of funds, and the settlement of disputes.4 
Germany, having lost almost all of her foreign investment during the Second World War, was 
the first country to sign a BIT with Pakistan in 1959.5 
At the highest level, BITs contain six core provisions which include: the right to national and 
most favoured nation treatment; protection against expropriation and fair, timely, and adequate 
compensation when it takes place; right to free transfer of capital and investment proceeds 
using a market-based exchange rate; a limitation on performance requirements, such as export 
                                                          
1
 Vandevelde,KJ Bilateral investment treaties: history, policy, and interpretation 2010 1. 
2
 Comeaux, PE and Kinsella, N.S “Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, Stabilisation Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance” 1994 New York Law School 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 3 www.kinsellalaw.com/wp-
content/uploads/publications/polrisk.pdf Accessed on 2015-1-7. 
3
 Mina, W  “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Encourage FDI in the GCC Countries?”  2010 SALJ 1 
http://www.african-review.com/Vol.%202%20(1)/Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaties%20and%20FDI.pdf  
Accessed on 2015-1-7. 
4
 Comeaux, PE and Kinsella, N.S “Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, Stabilisation Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance” 1994 New York Law School 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 3 www.kinsellalaw.com/wp-
content/uploads/publications/polrisk.pdf Accessed on 2015-1-7. 
5
 Neumayer,E & Spess, L 2005 “Do bilateral investment treaties increase foreign direct investment to 
developingcountries?” London:LSEResearchOnline 7 
http://www.eprints.lse.ac.uk/627/1/World_Dev_(BITs).pdf Accessed on 2015-1-7. 
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quotas; access to arbitration in the event of a dispute; and authority to select top managerial 
personnel of their choice.6 
BITs have six core principles, which are access, reasonableness, security, non-discrimination, 
transparency, and due process. 7 These six principles of BITs will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter Three. Any state could incorporate the substance of BIT obligations in its domestic 
legislation and thereby offer precisely the same protection without concluding a BIT.8 
The issue is, therefore, what the use is of concluding BITs for Ethiopia? In other words, what is 
the role of bilateral investment treaties in securing foreign investment for Ethiopia, if the country 
can provide the protection provided by BITs in its domestic legislation? 
 
1.2. ETHIOPIAN INVESTMENT LAW  
The Ethiopian Investment Proclamation No. 769/2012 has as its purpose the encouragement 
and expansion of investment. The Investment Proclamation offers substantive protection, such 
as in the areas of access and remittance of funds, and safeguards against expropriation. For 
instance, the Investment Proclamation provides that, areas of investment open for foreign 
investors will be determined by a regulation.  As in European countries access is subject to the 
application of local laws. It also allows any foreign investor to make remittances out of Ethiopia 
in convertible foreign currency at the prevailing rate of exchange on the date of remittance.  This 
proclamation states further that no investment may be expropriated or nationalised, except 
when that is required on account of public interest, and then only in conformity with the 
requirements of the law.  In addition, it provides that adequate compensation, corresponding to 
the prevailing market value, shall be paid in advance in a case of expropriation or nationalisation 
                                                          
6
 Leo, B “Where are the BITs? How U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties with Africa Can Promote 
Development” 2010 Center for global development www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1424333 
Accessed on 2015-1-7. 
7
 Vandevelde, KJ Bilateral investment treaties: history, policy, and interpretation 2010 2. 
8
 Idem at 4. 
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of an investment for public interest. The Investment Proclamation has provisions similar to those 
of BITs and investment laws in other countries.9   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
  Ethiopian Investment Proclamation “Investment Proclamation” No. 769/2012 
https://chilot.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/proclamation-no-769-2012-investment-proclamation.pdf     
Accessed on 2014-11-21.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2.1. HISTORY of BITs 
The first BITs appeared during the closing years of the 1950s. Some trace their history back to 
the treaties of friendship, navigation, and commerce (FNC) concluded by the United States over 
centuries. The FNC treaties had the growth of international trade and the improvement of US 
international relations as their key goals, even though some investment provisions were 
included later. BITs, in contrast, are more clearly focused on foreign investment protection.10 
At present we are in the era of economic globalisation. Economic globalisation refers to the fact 
that the increasing interdependence of world economies as a result of the growing scale of 
cross-border trade of commodities and services, flow of international capital and wide and rapid 
spread of technologies.11 The new wave of globalisation, which began about 1980 and 
continues until present, differs from the previous waves of globalisation i.e. form the first wave of 
globalisation: 1870–1914 and the second wave of globalisation: 1945–80.  This is shown by the 
facts that, firstly and most spectacularly, a large group of developing countries gained access to 
global markets. Secondly, other developing countries became increasingly marginalised in the 
world economy and suffered declining incomes and rising poverty. Thirdly, international 
migration and capital movements, which were negligible during second wave globalisation, have 
increased.12 
                                                          
10
 Neumayer,E & Spess, L 2005  “Do bilateral investment treaties increase foreign direct investment to 
developing countries?” London: LSE ResearchOnline 7 
http://www.eprints.lse.ac.uk/627/1/World_Dev_(BITs).pdf Accessed on 2015-1-7. 
11
 Shangquan, G “Economic Globalisation: Trends, Risks and Risk Prevention” 2000 Committee for 
Development Policy (CDP) Background Paper No. 1 ST/ESA/2000/CDP/1 1 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/cdp_background_papers/bp2000_1.pdf Accessed on 
2014-12-30. 
12
 Collier, P; Dollar, D; World Bank Globalisation, growth, and poverty : building an inclusive world 
economy  The new wave of globalisation and its economic effects 2002 31 
http://economia.unipv.it/pagp/pagine_personali/msassi/readinglist/globalization.pdf Accessed on 2014-12-
24. 
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The global era in the history of international investment treaties began at the end of the 1980s.13 
International investment agreements (IIAs) are a much broader concept than bilateral 
investment treaties. They include bilateral investment treaties, regional investment treaties 
signed by groups of states within a single region, and chapters of integrated trade and 
investment agreements that can be signed at the bilateral or regional level.14 This era reflects 
profound changes in the context in which international investment agreements were 
negotiated.15 In this era, the division that had characterised the Cold War era16  collapsed. For 
instance, in the Cold War era many writers had seen BITs as asymmetrical treaties to which 
developed countries unenthusiastically and, perhaps, unwisely adhered in order to stimulate 
and attract foreign investment. In the global era, states almost universally adopted the position 
that foreign investment could motivate economic prosperity, and they started jointly creating 
legal frameworks that would promote and defend international investment flows.17    
                                                          
13
 Vandevelde, KJ “A brief history of international investment agreement” 2005 Universty of California, 
Davis Vol.12:157 183 http://jilp.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/Volume%2012.1/van5.pdf  Accessed on 2014-6-
16. 
14
 Mann, H “International Investment Agreements, Business and Human Rights: Key Issues and 
Opportunities” February 2008 International Institute for Sustainable Development 3 
www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/iia_business_human_rights.pdf Accessed on 2015-1-7. 
15
 Vandevelde, KJ “A brief history of international investment agreement” 2005 Universty of California, 
Davis Vol.12:157 183 http://jilp.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/Volume%2012.1/van5.pdf  Accessed on 2014-6-
16. 
16
 The Cold War was the period from 1947-1988/9. The Cold War was driven by conflicting ideologies 
among the victorious allies in World War II. On one side stood the Soviet Union and the East European 
countries and, on the other side, stood the United States and Britain, supported by dozens of allied 
countries. (McNeill, J.R and Unger, C.R Environmental histories of the cold war 2010 1 
graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/international_history_politics/users/stratto9/public/Corin
na_R._Unger_(editor)-Environmental_Histories_of_the_Cold_War.pdf environmental histories of the cold 
war pdf  Accessed on 2015-1-7). 
17
 Vandevelde, KJ Bilateral investment treaties: history, policy, and interpretation 2010 67. 
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Similarly, in the post-colonial era, BITs were concluded between a capital-exporting developed 
country and a capital-importing developing country.18  The post-colonial era began at the end of 
the Second World War (1945) and continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991). 
Three events in particular describe this period. The first event was when the victorious allies 
began to show a consensus in favour of liberalising trade. The second event was the process of 
de-colonialisation that began after the war and that led to the creation of newly-independent but 
economically-undeveloped countries. The third event was the emergence of the socialist bloc 
led by the Soviet Union which led to massive expropriations of the private sector, including 
foreign-held assets.19 In the global era, the number of investment agreements among 
developing countries has grown remarkably as developing countries have become capital 
exporters, often to other developing countries.20 According to the World Investment Report 
2011, 20 of the 54 BITs signed in 2010 were between developing and/or transition economies.21 
In the global era, the very objective of investment treaties has been undergoing changes. While 
in the Cold War era, BITs were meant to protect the investments of developed countries in the 
territory of developing countries, chiefly against expropriation, in the global era agreements are 
increasingly intended to liberalise investment flows. They have become instruments of 
globalisation, eliminating bottlenecks to trade and investment, much in the same way as in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when it was the objective to establish commercial relations 
between countries.22 
                                                          
18
 Vandevelde, KJ “A brief history of international investment agreement” 2005 Universty of California, 
Davis Vol.12:157 183 http://jilp.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/Volume%2012.1/van5.pdf  Accessed on 2014-6-
16. 
19
 Idem  at 161. 
20
 Idem   at 183. 
21
 UNCTAD,World investment report 2011—non-equity modes of international production and 
development  2011 100 unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2011_en.pdf   Accessed on 2015-1-17.  
22
 Vandevelde, KJ Bilateral investment treaties: history, policy, and interpretation 2010 67. 
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Finally, the global era is also characterised by the number of countries that are now party to the 
BIT; for instance, more than 170 countries are now party to at least one BIT. The programme of 
entering in to a BIT is a truly global programme.23 
There are only a few (11) BITs among developed countries. The reason for this is that 
investment relations among developed countries are addressed through numerous mechanisms 
adopted under the patronage of the OECD to which all developed nations belong.24 
Almost every provisions that are now considered characteristic came into being in at least a few 
BITs in the 1960s, some provisions, however, did not become widespread until much later. For 
instance, the investor-state dispute provision did not emerge at all until the late 1960s. The 
increase in the number of provisions generally has been to make the BITs stronger. Secondly, 
some provisions have become more complex and meticulous in due course. For example, the 
investor-state dispute provision at first contained little more than the assent to arbitration before 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID), while more recent forms 
of that provision frequently consist of consent to arbitration before multiple fora, and they deal 
with a range of other procedural concerns. Some recent BITs25 also have specified substantive 
protective clauses in greater detail than existed in the earlier BITs, often with a view to clarifying 
their reach or substance. Thirdly, BITs more often take account of liberalisation obligations than 
                                                          
23
 Vandevelde, KJ “A brief history of international investment agreement” 2005 Universty of California, 
Davis Vol.12:157 183 http://jilp.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/Volume%2012.1/van5.pdf  Accessed on 2014-6-
16. 
24
 Hamilton, CA and Rochwerger, PI “Trade and Investment: Foreign Direct Investment Through Bilateral 
and Multilateral Treaties”  2005 International law review 6 
http://www.hamiltonabogados.es/downloads/publications/2005_New_York_Intl_Law_Review.pdf  
Accessed on 2015-1-7. 
25
 For example, the US and Canadian Models and the Mexico-Korea BIT provide that a tribunal may 
award monetary damages or restitution of property only in the final award. If the tribunal, however, 
awards restitution, its award must also provide for the possibility of pecuniary compensation in lieu thereof 
where restitution is not practicable. But, in any case, the tribunal must not order punitive damages as an 
award. (Houde, M, OECD International investment perspectives 2006 Novel features in recent OECD 
bilateral investment treaties 18 Sep 2006 174   
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/internationalinvestmentagreements/40072428.pdf Accessed on 2015-1-7). 
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they did in the past. For example, some BITs provide national treatment with regard to the right 
to starting investment and prohibit the imposition of certain performance requirements as a 
condition for the establishment of investment. The provision on unhindered transfer, which has 
both a protection and liberalisation rule, is much less often subordinated to local law in later 
BITs than it was in earlier BITs. Fourthly, some modern BITs have included more provisions 
which are anticipated to promote transparency in the treatment of investment and investor-state 
arbitration. The BITs taken as a whole have, thus, become more protective, liberalised, 
transparent, and complex over time.26 
Generally BITs have come through three stage models. During the initial wave of these treaties, 
the adoption of a BIT helped to reassure foreign investors by offsetting weak and instable 
domestic institutions in host countries. These treaties provided capital-exporting countries with 
auxiliary commitment mechanisms in addition to those provided by the legal institutions of host 
countries. The majority of BITs were, thus, formed between an economically-advanced, capital-
exporting country and a poorer ”capital-hungry” nation.27 
During the second wave of BITs, on the other hand, the majority of these treaties were signed 
by pairs of developing countries. This shift symbolised a growing tendency for states to view the 
forming of BITs as a fitting act for states to provide institutional protection to foreign 
investments, irrespective of any specific pressure from a potential foreign investor or its 
government. The drive for such behaviour could have been a rational cascade in which 
countries sign such treaties because similar countries are doing so. Another supportive 
explanation is that developing nations began to enter into an increasing number of these 
treaties with the intention of demonstrating commitment to what has become a global standard 
or norm about the treatment of FDI by a host state.28 
The third wave of BITs started with the growing realisation of the impending cost associated 
with these treaties, set off in the aftermath of the 1998-2000 East Asian financial crises. As both 
the potential costs and benefits of signing of BITs have become easier to see, only a fewer 
                                                          
26
 Vandevelde, KJ Bilateral investment treaties: history, policy, and interpretation 2010 7. 
27
 Jandhyala, S, Henisz, WJ and Mansfield, ED “Three Waves of BITs: The Global Diffusion of Foreign 
Investment Policy” 2011 Journal of Conflict Resolution 1048 http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/55/6/1047  
Accessed on 2015-1-7. 
28
 Idem at 1049.  
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countries are now blindly emulating their peers, and BITs that have been entered into are being 
driven by strategic considerations.29  
 
2.2. DEFINITION of BITs    
History demonstrates the vulnerability of the foreign investors in the territory of other states.30 
Political risk, i.e. non-commercial risk such as expropriation and civil disturbance31, may be 
considerably reduced if a treaty to defend private investment is in place between the country 
where the investment is to be made and the investor’s country of origin. Treaties aimed 
specifically at defending private foreign investment are known as bilateral investment treaties.32 
Bilateral investment treaties are legal instruments under international law between two 
contracting countries, the aim of which is to establish clear, simple, and enforceable rules for the 
reciprocal protection of foreign investment.33 Those treaties set forth standards for the treatment 
of foreign investment in areas such as the expropriation of property, the repatriation of founds, 
and the settlement of disputes.34 
                                                          
29
 Jandhyala, S, Henisz, WJ and Mansfield, ED “Three Waves of BITs: The Global Diffusion of Foreign 
Investment Policy” 2011 Journal of Conflict Resolution 1049 http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/55/6/1047  
Accessed on 2015-1-7. 
30
 Vandevelde, KJ Bilateral investment treaties: history, policy, and interpretation 2010 1. 
31
 Sacerdoti, G Bilateral treaties and multilateral instruments on investment protection 1997 405. 
32
 Comeaux, PE  and Kinsella, N.S  “Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, Stabilisation Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance” 1994 New York 
Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 3 www.kinsellalaw.com/wp-
content/uploads/publications/polrisk.pdf Accessed on 2015-1-7. 
33
 Mina, W “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Encourage FDI in the GCC Countries?” 2010 SALJ 1 
http://www.african-review.com/Vol.%202%20(1)/Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaties%20and%20FDI.pdf  
Accessed on 2015-1-7. 
34
 Comeaux, PE  and Kinsella, N.S  “Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, Stabilisation Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance” 1994 New York 
Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 3 www.kinsellalaw.com/wp-
content/uploads/publications/polrisk.pdf Accessed on 2015-1-7. 
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While investors can, and should, use other methods to reduce political risk, such as concession 
agreements and governmental sponsored insurance programmes, BITs provide a strong 
incentive for a host state to honour its obligations under both international law and its 
agreements with the investor. When the host state violates the rights guaranteed to the investor 
in terms of the BITs, the state has not only violated norms of customary international law, but 
has also breached a treaty with the investor’s home state.35 
There is currently no comprehensive multilateral instrument for the regulation of foreign 
investment. Foreign investment is, therefore, subject only to a varied collection of BITs. 
Regional investment treaties, and, at the multilateral level, the World Trade Organisation’s 
limited-scope Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, and the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services.36  
The success of a BIT programme depends upon the readiness of the host state to agree to the 
legal responsibility imposed by the treaties. More specifically, the intention of BITs is to create 
conditions under which foreign investors are more likely to enter the host state market.37 
 
2.3. GENERAL ELEMENTS of BITs  
Typically, BITs contain six central provisions: the right to national and most-favoured nation 
treatment; protection against expropriation, and fair, timely, and adequate compensation when it 
takes place; the right to free transfer capital and investment proceeds using market based 
exchange rate; the limitation on performance requirements, such as export quotas; the access 
                                                          
35
 Comeaux, PE  and Kinsella, N.S  “Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, Stabilisation Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance” 1994 New York 
Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 3 www.kinsellalaw.com/wp-
content/uploads/publications/polrisk.pdf Accessed on 2015-1-7. 
36
 Mosoti, V “Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Possibility of a Multilateral Framework on Investment at 
the WTO: Are Poor Economies Caught in Between?”  2005  Northwestern Journal of International Law & 
Business 101 http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol26/iss1/9/ Accessed on 2015-1-7. 
37
  Vandevelde, KJ Bilateral investment treaties: history, policy, and interpretation 2010 2.  
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to arbitration in the event of a dispute; and the authority to select top managerial personnel of 
their choice.38 
BITs confer rights upon a foreign investor, and, while the specific wording of BITs varies, it 
tends to contain the provisions described below. Most countries have a Model BIT which serves 
as a template and is typically used as a point of departure to conduct negations of new BITs. 
“The following provisions taken from the United State Model BITs are examples of rights BITs 
commonly confer.39 
A national treatment provision provides that foreign investors have the right not to be treated 
less favourably than domestic investors in like circumstances.  
A most-favoured-nation treatment stipulates that foreign investors have the right not to be 
treated less favourably than investors of any other country. 
A fair and equitable treatment provision provides that foreign investors have the right to 
minimum standards of treatment.  
The expropriation provision ensures that foreign investors have the right to be compensated for 
expropriations.” 
Most BITs have a dispute resolution clause that constitutes unilateral readiness to resolve 
disputes by arbitration, extended to the investor by the state and which the investor accepts by 
initiating arbitration under the treaty.40BITs have a number of common elements. These treaties 
are bilateral, that is, they involve two states, often a capital-exporting and capital-importing 
state. They are formally reciprocal, that is, for example, the Germany-Pakistan treaty applies 
equally to German investors in Pakistan and to Pakistani investors in Germany. The treaties 
deal more or less exclusively with investment issues, excluding, for example, trade-related 
                                                          
38
 Leo, B “Where are the BITs? How U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties with Africa Can Promote 
Development” 2010 Center for global development www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1424333 
Accessed on 2015-1-7. 
39
 Sheffer, MW “Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Friend or Foe to Human Rights?” 2011 Denv. J. Int’l L. & 
pol’y. 488 http://heinonline.org/  Accessed on 2014-3-25. 
40
 Ibid.  
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issues, and they typically define investment very broadly. Most BITs extend to the investor a 
common core of substantive promises of favourable treatment.41   
BITs seek to provide economic gains to both capital-importing companies as well as to firms 
from capital-exporting countries. For capital-importing countries, they help to attract foreign 
direct investment by companies located in the partner country’s home territory. For capital-
exporting countries, BITs provide protection to investors of those countries who are worried 
about the quality of institutions and the rule of law in developing countries.42 
While most BITs concluded in the last decade have a comparable basic structure and content, 
discrepancy exists both in respect of the underlying rationale and the degree of protection 
accorded by the specific provisions. There are, at present, two model BITs in operation, namely 
the ’European model’, based on the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention,43 and the ’North 
American Model’ developed in the early 1980s.44 The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention of 1959 
was a revised version of a draft instrument entitled International Convention for the Mutual 
Protection of Private Property Rights in Foreign Countries. Which was published by the Society 
to Advance the Protection of Foreign Investments, an organisation of German business people. 
The aim of Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention was to create a multilateral agreement to protect 
private foreign investment.45 The Draft Convention was considered by the Organisation for 
                                                          
41
 Yackee, JW  “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from 
Alternative Evidence” 2011 Virginia Journal of International Law 402 http://www.vjil.org/articles/do-
bilateral-investment-treaties-promote-foreign-direct-investment-some-hints-from-alternative-evidence  
Accessed on 2015-1-7.   
42
 Shoaf, JR, B.A. A BIT of  Regulatory Chill? Assessing the effect of bilateral investment treaties on the 
enactment of environmental regulations 2013 Washington, DC Thesis 3 
https:/ /repository. l ibrary.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/558655   Accessed on 2015-1-7. 
43
 UNCTAD, “Draft Convention on Investments Abroad (Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention)” United 
Nations, New York 2000 International Investment Instruments: A Compendium Volume V, Non-
Governmental Instruments https://www.international-arbitration-attorney.com/wp-content/uploads/137-
volume-5.pdf. Accessed on 2015-2-6.  
44
 Eilmansberger, T “Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law” 2009 Common Market Law Review 386 
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European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) and adopted by the OECD in 1962 with some 
revisions in 1967 as the OECD Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property. 46  
The major distinction between the two models is that the former applies largely to the post-
establishment stage47, while the latter covers investment at the pre-establishment phase48 as 
well. Although most recent BITs follow the traditional ’European model’ approach, the number of 
agreements including pre-establishment rights is on the increase. Such BITs have been 
concluded primarily by Canada, the United States, and, more recently, Japan. 49 
The two elements distinguishing contemporary BITs from previous bilateral agreements 
concerning investment are the pervasive use of MFN and arbitration clauses.50 
Recent BITs delineate investment to cover all descriptions of the transfer of, and ownership in, 
financial, tangible rights, and claims of an economic value which correspond to, or are linked to, 
an investment in the economic sense.51 
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2.4. THE DIFFERENT ACADEMIC OPINIONS on BITs and FDI                                                 
The UNCTAD’s 1998 study provided the first important economic study of the relationship 
between BITs and FDI52 using both time series and cross sectional analyses.53 The authors 
analyse time-series data for 200 BITs from the period 1971 to 1994. More specifically, they test 
the bilateral investment flows between two countries that have signed a BIT with each other for 
different time frames using T-statistics.54 55   
Test statistic (T-statistic) refers to a method of statistic by which a quantity is calculated from the 
sample of data.56 
The time series study (a time series is a sequence of data points, measured typically at 
successive points in time, spaced at uniform time intervals) found that BITs have an upbeat, 
albeit not so strong, effect on FDI, whilst the cross-sectional analysis showed a positive impact 
of BITs on the total level of FDI flow and on FDI flows relative to GDP. “The conclusion of the 
cross-sectional analysis generally is that the leading determinant is market size with BITs 
playing an insignificant and secondary role in attracting FDI.”57  
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Up to now, there are only four eminent studies on whether BITs increase FDI flows to 
developing countries, all of which report conflicting evidence.58 
2.4.1. Hallward-Driemeir study 
The first notable study was made by Hallward-Driemeir in 2003. Its aim was to look at whether 
BITs actually deliver their expected benefits of stimulating additional foreign direct investment in 
developing countries and providing fair protection to the property of foreign investors in high-risk 
business environments.59 
Hallward-Driemeir found little empirical support that BITs have actually encouraged additional 
investment in developing countries. She also found that BITs have not succeeded in improving 
property rights in developing countries which have weak domestic institutions, but that they do 
improve property rights in developing nations that already have convincingly strong home 
institutions.60 Home institutions are such as non-corrupt, clean bureaucracies, clear and 
effective rulings by the courts, the rule of law, limits on the use and abuse of executive power, or 
the electoral accountability of the executive.61 
 
2.4.2. Tobin & Rose-Ackerman study 
The second study by Tobin and Rose-Ackerman in 2005 found that BITs do have a positive 
impact on FDI flows to developing countries. This positive effect is, however, greatly dependent 
on the political and economic contexts of both FDI and BITs. Tobin and Rose-Ackerman found 
that more stable political and economic environments are necessary for BITs to have an impact 
on FDI. More importantly, their results demonstrate that the impact of a BIT programme can be 
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understood only within a broader context and understanding of the political and economic 
environment of the host country.62  
 
2.4.3. Neumayer and Spess study 
The third study, by Erice Neumayer and Laura Spess in 2005, provides evidence that a greater 
number of BITs concluded with OECD member states truly increased FDI flows to developing 
countries.63 
2.4.4. Emma Aisbett study 
The last study by Aisbett in 2007, claims that policy adoption to promote FDI is   endogenously 
determined. In the case of BITs, there is potential internal cause owing to both 64 reverse 
causality (in the sense that increasing FDI flows increase the probability of a BIT being formed) 
and omitted variables (such as the host’s investment climate).65 For instance, increased FDI 
flows in one year may cause a BIT to be signed in the next, or an improvement in the 
investment climate of the host may cause a simultaneous increase in both FDI and BIT 
participation.66  
 
Aisbett’s study concludes that while BITs and FDI appear initially to be highly correlated, this 
finding is not robust enough to conclude that BITs have a casual effect on FDI.67 
The view of the author of this dissertation is that BITs cause FDI to flow to developing countries. 
As can be seen from the above references, the studies support the position, albeit to varying 
degrees, that the signing of BITs can stimulate FDI. Only Aisbett has concluded that BITs do not 
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have a causal effect on FDI. Moreover, the study done by Neumayer and Spess has provided 
evidence that a greater number of BITs signed with OECD members actually increase the FDI 
flow to developing countries. There is, thus, evidence that can support my position, viz. that a 
BIT could actually increase FDI.   
BITs are unlikely to be alike in their effect on incoming FDI flows.  Signing a BIT with a major 
capital exporter such as Germany or the United States of America, therefore, has a larger 
impact on FDI inflows than signing a BIT with minor capital exporters such as New Zealand or 
Portugal. The signing of BITs, however, sends out a signal to potential investors that the 
developing country is generally serious about the protection of foreign investment. The 
encouragement of FDI flows, thus, needs not to be restricted to investors from developed 
countries that are BIT partners of the developing countries. Clearly, BITs can therefore, have a 
positive spill-over effect.68 
BITs derived their economic justification from two arguments both of which explain the fact that 
sometimes investment policies lack credibility. As a result of this lack of credibility, an efficient 
investment, which would otherwise have taken place, is not carried out in the absence of a BIT. 
These arguments are ‘adverse selection’ and ‘time inconsistency’.69 
Time inconsistency refers to the fact that there is no long-term credible commitment possible 
from the side of the host country, i.e. the host country government will always have incentives, 
in the short run, to change the terms of existing foreign investments when the short-run benefits 
exceed the long-term costs.70 
Adverse selection is relevant to see how BITs can have a positive spill-over effect. Adverse 
selection refers to the fact that information about the true intentions of a government may be 
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private, i.e. when observers lack information about the beliefs and values that are motivating a 
government to pursue a certain policy.71 
BITs can remedy the credibility problem by ex-ante costs (signals). Signalling in the context of 
BITs and FDI may be defined as sending a broadly received ’signal’ that a country is 
trustworthy. In other words, doubts about the true intentions of the host state government, 
stemming from the information asymmetry can be reduced on the side of the investors as they 
“update” their beliefs when the host country signs/ratifies a BIT.72  
 
 BITs, therefore, have the potential to overcome the problems of adverse selection (through 
signalling). An efficient agreement between the host state and the investor can be reached 
because the signalling mechanism enables commitments by the host state to be seen as 
credible by the investor and so helps to overcome the credibility problem arising from the 
information asymmetry. Efficient location choices can, thus, be made, and BITs should, 
therefore, have a positive effect on FDI.73 
 
Although the commitment effect may relate only to investors from BIT partner countries, the 
signalling effect which benefits investors from all countries has a positive spill-over effect on 
FDI.74 
 
2.5. CRITICS of BITs 
Since its implementation the BIT initiative has come under fire.  Criticisms relate, firstly, to the 
fact that, in practice, the scale of benefits is often seen to be in favour of the developed nation 
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over the host nation.75 It was originally the OECD members that began concluding reciprocal 
BITs with developing countries who had demonstrated some willingness to co-operate. 
Developed countries made negotiation offers to these developing countries individually. These 
offers were made on the basis of the provisions in the draft OECD Convention for the Protection 
of Foreign Assets. 76 77 Given the fact that the origin of BITs stems from these former colonial 
powers with the largest economies now, it should, therefore, be recognised that “existing 
international investment agreements are based on a 50-year-old model that remains focused on 
the interest of investors from developing countries”.78 While a reform is now being made to the 
existing model BIT, the modern BITs are still largely drafted to benefit the developed countries 
investing in the developing nation. This often leads to a situation where the developed country is 
reaping the largest benefit from the agreement.79 
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The second criticism relates to the BITs’ ability to limit state regulatory power.80 The extent of 
interference of BITs with domestic regulatory sovereignty is substantial. In fact, practically any 
public policy regulation can potentially be challenged through the dispute settlement mechanism 
as long as it impacts on foreign investments.81 Critics admit that “BITs seriously restrict the 
ability of the host states to regulate foreign investment”. In concluding BITs, developing 
countries are “trading sovereignty for credibility”.82 
Thirdly, the arbitration clauses of the BITs allow individual investors to force the government of a 
country into international arbitration if that country enacts any regulation that in some way 
affects their investment contract.   These arbitration clauses could open the door for unhappy 
investors to sue the government of these countries for a breach of treaty rights. In this way the 
unhappy investor can use the clause for defending any failure resulting from his decision 
relative to his investment.  Such litigation can be quite expensive and damaging to the 
developing country’s government and economic soundness.83  
Fourthly, criticism of the BITs stems from the fact that BIT disputes are often resolved in secret. 
Preferences for commercial confidentiality often prohibit public knowledge of the arbitration 
process.84 Although the resolution clause often requires the outcome of the arbitration to remain 
private and public access to the decision be restricted, from a public point of view this lack of 
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access could be harmful. Many argue that the public has the right to know about the outcome of 
cases.85 
The ICSID offers the greatest level of transparency; all ICSID pending and concluded cases are 
available to the public, including the subject matter of the arbitration, party names, date of 
registration, composition of the tribunal, and the procedural timeline. Actual ICSID arbitration 
tribunals, however, cannot be described as completely transparent. Information on the parties' 
arguments, the minutes, and other records of the proceeding are not made available, and the 
parties may agree to keep the contents of the final award confidential. Moreover, all 
proceedings are closed to the public unless both parties agree otherwise.86 
 
Other investment tribunals that offer much less transparency are, for example, the UNCITRAL 
whose rules require that awards are not published unless both parties consent to their being so. 
Consequently, an unknown number of BIT arbitration cases have been finished without any 
public disclosure or any ability of interested observers to monitor and analyse developments in 
the investment law system.87 
 
Fifthly, criticism of the BITs comes with the recognition that the BIT agreement is a finite 
measure of regulating trade. A BIT and the policies that it declares will last only as long as the 
agreement lasts.  This could make for a somewhat insecure investment situation when a BIT is 
due to be terminated and not extended. As BITs last for a fixed period of time, the problem of 
having to renegotiate an agreement with a country every five or so years arises. The expense of 
this problem is somewhat lightened by the fact that the BIT is based on a model draft. However, 
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the fact that BITs last for such a limited period of time makes them more expensive and time-
consuming to maintain than other forms of trade treaties.88 
 
Sixthly, criticism of the BITs regime is that, thus far, international investment law and human 
rights law have existed in separate spheres. Human rights norms are absent in the development 
of domestic investment policies and in the formation of BITs. A state's duty to protect against 
non-state abuses is part of the very foundation of the international human rights regime. 
Governments, however, often keep human rights policy segregated from the development of 
policies regarding investment. This often results in circumstances where departments and 
agencies which directly shape business practices typically work in isolation from, and 
uninformed by, their government's own human rights obligations and agencies. 89 
 
Arbitrations of investment disputes and disputes arising under BITs are generally treated as 
solely commercial disputes. Human rights, typically, have little if any role to play in such 
arbitrations. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to address human rights violations 
will depend on the specific wording of the underlying BIT.90 
The fact that investment treaties are silent on human rights issues does not, however, mean 
that human rights issues are irrelevant to disputes that arise between investors and their host 
governments. Certainly, there are several ways in which human rights may be relevant to 
investment treaty disputes between governments.91 
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In numerous arbitrations between foreign investors and their host governments, arbitrators 
(and/or counsel for investors) have referred to human rights jurisprudence in the course of 
interpreting and applying the protections owed to investors under investment treaties.  This has, 
however, been done without much theoretical explanation for the reason for resorting to human 
rights jurisprudence.92 
 
The rise of a human rights discourse in investment arbitration has happened in two distinct 
ways. Investors have raised human rights arguments to support their claims that BIT provisions 
have been breached. On the other hand, governments have used the human rights of their 
citizens to defend allegations of treaty breaches.93 
 
The most visible circumstance where a government’s human rights obligations to those living 
within its territory may come into the frame of investment arbitrations is in relation to foreign 
investments in the water and sanitation sector.94 
 
Arbitration tribunals have limited jurisdiction, and the function of arbitrators is usually limited to 
finding and determining whether breaches exist with regard to a particular BIT provision.  The 
arbitrators are not empowered to look into whether human rights have been violated.95 The 
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arbitrators in investment treaty disputes, therefore, have no jurisdiction to hold states liable for 
any breach of their human rights obligations.96 
 
For example, the tribunal in Biloune v. Ghana found that it was not even competent to decide on 
the alleged human rights violations inflicted upon the investor. It held: 
    “… contemporary international law recognises that all individuals, regardless of nationality, 
are  entitled to fundamental human rights…, which no government may violate. Nevertheless, it 
does not follow that this Tribunal is competent to pass upon every type of departure from the 
minimum standard to which foreign national are entitled, or that this Tribunal is authorised to 
deal with allegations of violation of fundamental human rights.”97 
Those tribunals can take into consideration the rules of international law in order to apply and 
interpret the BITs. They cannot, however, justify the breach of a BIT on the grounds of the 
state’s compliance with human rights obligations, especially when the breach of the BIT 
provision has not been in consideration of one of those principles that have been considered jus 
cogens.98 
 
Most BIT arbitrators, furthermore, have commercial backgrounds and are not familiar with 
matters relating to human rights related laws. Even if an arbitral tribunal found it appropriate to 
address human rights-related matters, the arbitrators may not be fully versed in how to proceed. 
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Equally, many human rights experts would similarly lack the necessary expertise in international 
investment law to serve as arbitrators in investment arbitration.99 
The relationship between human rights and foreign investment law is recognised as complex, 
yet observers generally agree that international investment law and arbitration have an adverse 
impact on the promotion and protection of human rights.100 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3.1. PROTECTION OF BITs IN GENERAL 
A provision of a BIT may relate to investment in any of four ways. Such a provision may protect 
investment, such as where it guarantees compensation for expropriation; it may liberalise 
investment, such as where it grants foreign investors the right to establish investment; it may 
promote investment, such as where it provides investment insurance; or it may regulate 
investment, such as where it prohibits corrupt payments by investors.101 
The six principles, access, reasonableness, security, non-discrimination, transparency, and due 
process, are the core principles of BITs. These six core principles provide the conceptual 
foundation on which virtually all BITs rest.102  
Much of the BIT consists of investment protection provisions which afford protection that is 
either absolute or relative. Relative treatment provisions define the treatment that must be 
provided by reference to the treatment provided to the same investors or investments. In a 
broad sense, such provisions in general require that similar investments be treated similarly. 
Absolute treatment provisions define the treatment that must be provided without reference to 
any other similar or comparable investors or investments.  These treatment provisions can be 
further categorised as either general or specific. General standards apply to the treatment of 
covered investment in virtually any act of discrimination relating to an investment. Specific 
standards apply to a narrower scope of circumstances, such as where a BIT prohibits 
discrimination with regard to compensation for losses suffered owing to war.103  
As important as those protections are, the BITs investment security provisions are subject to 
some momentous limitations. Typically, they provide very little substantive protection against 
private interference with investment, such as the pirating of intellectual property. Similarly, their 
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procedural protection provisions generally do not guarantee that foreign investors have a 
successful means of resolving private disputes pertaining to their investments.104 
A state could include the substance of BIT obligations in its domestic legislation and thereby 
offer precisely the same protections without concluding a BIT. Such legislation, however, is 
subject to amendments, and, thus, investors cannot put their faith in the continued existence of 
any protection that the legislation provides. The role of the BIT, then, is that it publicly obliges 
the host state to a particular kind of conduct, that is, it brings a greater security and 
transparency to the investment climate than could be achieved by domestic laws alone.105  
BITs are, a direct response to the basic ’dynamic inconsistency’ problem. The  dynamic 
inconsistency problem arises from the fact that, although host countries have a motivation to 
promise fair and equitable treatment beforehand in order to attract foreign investment, once that 
investment is established and investors have  incurred significant costs the host country’s 
incentive is to exploit, or even expropriate, the assets of foreign investors. Even those host 
states that are willing to give up taking advantage in these circumstances will find it very difficult 
to commit creditably to their position. Many developing countries have adopted domestic legal 
revisions over the last decade or so with a view to stimulating a greater FDI inflow. Those 
domestic legal rules, however, cannot be a substitute for the commitment device offered by 
entering into a legally binding bilateral investment treaty. BITs, and their binding investor-to-
state dispute settlement provisions in particular, are meant to overcome the dilemma facing host 
countries that are ready to censure exploiting foreign investors after the investment has already 
been undertaken. Interestingly, at the same time as BITs blossomed in the 1980s and 1990s, 
complete expropriations of foreign investors, which were common during the 1960s and 1970s, 
practically ceased to take place.106 
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Preceding the emergence of BITs, the only protection for foreign investors was the customary 
international legal rule of a minimum standard of treatment and the so-called Hull rule.107 
International law requires only “a minimum of fairness in the treatment of foreigners and foreign 
investment”.108  The Hull rule dealt exclusively with cases of expropriation and, therefore, 
provided no general protection against discriminatory treatment. The Hull rule grew out of a 
dispute between Mexico and US in the 1930s over properties expropriated by the government of 
Mexico. In one of diplomatic notes to the Mexican Minster of Foreign Affairs, the US Secretary 
of State, Cordell Hull, stated that ‘no government is entitled to expropriate private property, for 
whatever purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment therefore’. 
Consequently, the rule of ’prompt, adequate, and effective’ compensation would be the standard 
known as the Hull rule.109 
Considering the ambiguity of the obligations stemming from general international law, the 
spelling out of treatment in BITs in agreement with their purpose is clearly explicable and is one 
of their major objects.110 
BITs are, thus, an important tool of protection for foreign investors, for whom there is currently 
not much legal alternative. Few regional free trade agreements contain investment protection 
provisions like the NAFTA. The World Trade Organisation’s Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement) imposes only simple disciplines on the regulation of 
foreign investments that are, by far, not as broad as, and fall much short of, provisions 
contained in BITs.111 
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3.2. PRINCIPLES OF BITs  
3.2.1. REASONABLENESS  
The reasonableness principle requires that the host state’s treatment of foreign investment be 
based only on a legitimate exercise of its regulatory authority.  It, therefore, prohibits treatment 
that is arbitrary or motivated by political or discriminatory considerations.112 
The most typical provision requires that the host state accords covered investment fair and 
equitable treatment.113 
3.2. 1.1. Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) is regarded as a non-contingent standard that provides 
treatment owed to foreign investors regardless of how a host state treats its own investors. Non-
contingent standards require a host state to accord an absolute degree of protection to foreign 
investors, irrespective of the changes in the host state’s law or its protection lapses with respect 
to treatment of its own nationals and companies. FET, thus, differs from contingent standards of 
investment protection such as the national or most-favoured nation treatment standards.114 
The majority of BITs make reference to the FET standard. The precise formation of the FET 
obligation, and thus its scope and content, is, however, subject to variation. Studies have 
identified different models of the FET obligation in contemporary BITs. While some BITs contain 
a simple reference to ’fair and equitable treatment’, others clearly state the standard together 
with a reference to the obligation of full protection and security or the standard of non-
discrimination.115  
Some BITs enunciate the FET standard regarding general international law. A more recent 
approach, found in the Canadian and US Model BITs, is to define FET expressly as the 
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customary international law Minimum Standard of Treatment (MST) applicable to foreign 
investors and their property. For example, Article 5 of the United States-Uruguay BIT, specifies 
that FET is a part of the customary international law MST and details the scope of the 
obligations governed by that standard.116 
 
The diversity of treaty words rules out any authoritative statement on the FET standard in the 
BIT context. Investment tribunals have generally adopted the additive approach to FET, 
proceeding by way of a plain reading of the treaty’s terms. The award in the MTD Equity v 
Chile117 case illustrates this trend.118 Very few arbitral tribunals have followed the traditional 
approach that equates the FET with the MST or have made a reference to international law.119 
 
3.2.2. SECURITY  
Security is possibly the oldest of the BIT principles to be found in an investment treaty. It is the 
principal concern of BITs. Provisions relating to security were present in the first BITs and are 
universally present in contemporary BITs. These security provisions do not provide investment 
with security against all events, but rather against particular kinds of host state conduct. The two 
common provisions that are universal in BITs protect investment against exchange controls and 
wrongful expropriations. An observance of the obligations provision preserves the security of 
obligations with respect to investment.120  
3.2.2.1. Full protection and security 
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Many BITs require that investments receive ’full protection and security’. Full protection and 
security is an established standard of customary international law that requires the host state to 
exercise due diligence or reasonable care to prevent injury to the property (and person) of 
foreign investors. The BITs that incorporate this standard thus make explicit that the standard 
applies to covered investment, although it would apply through customary international law even 
if it were not included in the treaty. Its inclusion, however, ensures that the standard is 
enforceable through the investor-state and state-state dispute settlement provisions.121  
The full protection and security treatment provision may be a stand-alone provision or it may be 
incorporated into the fair and equitable treatment or the treatment provision of BITs.122 The 
formulation used in the current BITs confirms the autonomous character of the standard.123 
The Dutch Model Text of March 2004 qualifies the protection clause with the phrase ’physical’. 
This clearly implies that the standard is not meant to cover just any kind of impairment of an 
investor’s investment, but rather to protect the investor and his property from physical threats 
and injuries, particularly from actions or armed insurgents, or disgruntled workers. This would 
preclude the legal security of the investor from the standard.124  
Two aspects of the full protection and security standard are important in establishing its content. 
Firstly, the standard does not impose stringent liability on the host state. The host state’s 
obligation is met when the state takes action that is reasonable under the circumstances to 
protect investment, even if that action is unsuccessful in preventing damage to the investment. 
Secondly, it requires a host state to act to prevent injury by private parties as well as by state 
actors.125 
3.2.2.2. Observance of obligation 
Foreign investor bargaining power rapidly declines after an investor has placed his investment 
under the host state. The purpose of the umbrella clause provision of BITs is to provide 
protection under international law for commitments assumed by the host state which were 
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conductive to the investment and on which the investor could rely in good faith. The observance 
of obligation aims at protecting the investor against opportunistic host state behaviour  once the 
investment has been made, such as the risk of the state terminating a concessions agreement 
because a  competitor of the investor promises a higher rent to the state.126 
This provision, thus, seeks to ensure that each contracting party to the treaty will respect the 
specific undertaking towards nationals of the other party. The umbrella clause provision is of 
particular importance because it protects the investor’s contractual right against any interference 
which might be caused by either a simple breach of contract or by administrative or legislative 
acts.127 Many BITs unequivocally address the enforceability of contractual commitments of the 
host state to an investor.128 
Investment tribunals follow a divergence of interpretation of the umbrella clause in investment 
arbitration. Some arbitral tribunals have held the view that the observance of obligations clause 
elevates contractual breach to BIT breach with the implication that a host state violating a 
contractual obligation is automatically in breach of its BIT obligation to observe such obligation. 
In the Austrian Model BIT of 2008, Article 11(1) followed this approach according to which a 
breach of a contract between the investor and the host state will amount to a violation of the 
BIT. On the other hand, other tribunals have held that this is not the consequence of an 
umbrella clause.129 
3.2.2.3. Expropriation 
Expropriation is the single greatest impairment of the security of an investment. It is an act that 
eliminates all or substantially all of the value of the investment to the investor.130 “According to 
general international law, a state is free to adopt measures of expropriation or nationalisation of 
a foreign investment in its territory. In fact, following the changes that have affected the 
international community after the Second World War (namely, de-colonisation and the birth of 
many new state) such a freedom is no longer disputed because private property is no longer 
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deemed to be basically inviolable.”131 The lawful recourse to these measures, however, is 
subject, under international law, to certain requirements. These requirements are, the 
requirement of, public purpose or interest, non-discrimination, the payment of compensation, 
and the procedural requirement of legality or due process.132 The peril of expropriation was a 
principal motivating factor in the origin of the BITs. Accordingly, BITs universally incorporated a 
provision limiting the right of the host state to confiscate covered investment.133 Not all 
governmental deprivation of the property of foreign investors constitutes an expropriation. 
International law authorities have regularly recognised three broad categories of ’public power’ 
regulation that might justify non-compensation where there is a deprivation: (1) public order and 
morality; (2) protection of human health and environment; and (3) state taxation.134 
3.2.2.3.1. Conditions for Expropriation  
Various BITs have codified the elements of lawful expropriation.  For expropriation to be lawful it 
shall, therefore, be carried out: for reasons of public or social interest; following due process of 
law; in a non-discriminatory and good faith manner; and accompanied by prompt, adequate, and 
effective compensation.135 Some BITs also, in addition to those elements, make a condition for 
the lawfulness of expropriation, respect for specific commitments, either explicitly within the 
expropriation clause, or by reference to other articles in the BIT providing for the observance of 
undertakings.136  
With regard to the condition of compensation, many  BITs have adopted the traditional Hull rule 
of the ’prompt, adequate, and effective’  formula, though some BITs have instead employed 
more general terms, to describe the required compensation, such as ’just’, ’full’, ’reasonable’ or 
’fair and equitable’.137   
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For instance, most of the BITs entered into by Korea, consistent with the 2001 Korean Model 
BIT, require that  any expropriation be accompanied by prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation, and  they define the phrase ’prompt, adequate, and effective compensation’.138  
3.2.2.3.2. Compensation  
3.2.2.3.2.1. Adequate compensation 
Many BITs refer to fair market value with respect to the value of the expropriated investment.139 
The fair market value would be the amount that a willing buyer would normally pay to a willing 
seller after taking into account the nature of the investment, the circumstance in which it would 
operate in the future, and its specific characteristics, including the period in which it has been in 
existence, the proportion of tangible assets in the total investment, and other relevant factors 
pertinent to the specific circumstance of each case.140     
3.2.2.3.2.2. ’Prompt and effective’ compensation  
The ’prompt and effective’ requirement imposes the additional requirement that compensation 
be paid without delay and in a freely convertible currency. Beyond the issue of the amount of 
compensation, therefore, matters of time and convertibility are dealt with.141 
Promptness usually is described as payment without delay or without undue delay. Those BITs 
that attempt to define the requirement more precisely generally state that provision for payment 
shall be made at, or prior to, the time at which the expropriation occurs.142  
A few BITs admit that payment may be over a period of time in cases of exceptional balance of 
payment problems by the application of the relevant provision of the BIT in the matter of 
transfers generally.143 
Effective compensation is meant to guarantee that the investor realises, i.e.  he is able to make 
use of, the benefit of the compensation. Commonly BITs require that the compensation be paid 
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in a freely convertible currency, meaning a currency that is exchanged on the principal foreign 
exchange markets of the world.144    
The lapse of time that may occur between the time when the obligation to compensation has 
been definitively established and the date on which payment is made raises the issue of 
entitlement to interest. There is, however, no common approach to this problem in BIT practice. 
Some BITs specifically provide that compensation shall include interest from the date of 
expropriation; most BITs, however, fail to specify the date from when interest payments shall be 
calculated.145  
Expropriation provisions very often apply to both direct and indirect expropriation.146 The legal 
consequences are the same whether the expropriation occurs instantaneously or over a long 
period of time, ’creeping expropriation’.147 Direct expropriation occurs where an investment is 
nationalised or taken directly through formal transfer of title or outright seizure, and indirect 
expropriation occurs when an action or series of actions by a state party have an effect 
equivalent to a direct taking without formal transfer of title or outright seizure.148                                                                                                                
3.2.2.4. War and civil disturbance 
Foreign investment may be affected by political and non-commercial risks other than 
expropriation, such as civil disorder.149 With regard to such situations of war or armed conflict, 
etc., according to customary international law, the host state is not obliged to pay compensation 
in relation to a foreign investor for loss suffered.150 Likewise BITs do not establish an absolute 
right of compensation for losses suffered in time of armed conflict or international disturbance, 
but merely require that the foreign investor be accorded national and MFN treatment with regard 
to any measures directed at offsetting or minimising such losses.151 Under this rule, if the host 
state awards a particular from of settlement or restitution to its own investor or the investor of a 
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third country when their investment have suffered losses owing to these events at issue, the 
host state must award the same or an equivalent form of settlement or restitution to the investor 
of the other party whose investment may have suffered losses from such events.152   
3.2.2.5. Currency transfer 
Restriction on the transfer of funds may have numerous adverse consequences. Such 
restrictions may weaken investor confidence and can reduce the inflow of foreign investment, 
involve significant administrative costs to regulate and enforce, artificially reduce the pressure 
for countries to institute needed economic reforms, and increase the risk to the domestic 
economy in a time of crisis.153 
One of the typical protective clauses for investment in BITs guarantees the remittance abroad 
both of current payments, concerning any investment covered by the treaty, and the proceeds of 
its sale or liquidation.154  
This clause, however, does not defend the investor against the general exchange risk relative to 
the currency of the host country in terms of the value of the investment as expressed in 
currency.155 
The currency transfer of BITs typically provides that each party shall permit the free transfer of 
certain payments related to an investment. The provision must identify the transfer to which it 
applies and define what is meant by free transferability.156 
Commonly, the transfer provision applies to all ’transfers’ or ’payments’ related to an 
investment. Usually, this language is accompanied by an illustrative list of transfers or payments 
to which the provisions apply.157 
Some BITs include an exception with regard to certain kinds of ordinary restrictions on the free 
movement of capital that are unrelated to investment policy. Most common is an exception 
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relating to restrictions to implement the host state’s tax law.  For example, the U.S. BITs contain 
an exception to laws which impose the withholding of taxes, while other BITs specify that taxes 
must be paid prior to transfer. Further exceptions relate to equitable, good faith, non-
discriminatory measures to protect the rights of creditors, to regulate the securities market, to 
enforce the criminal laws, and to enforce judgments. Numerous BITs also provide that transfers 
shall be in accordance with the exchange regulations in force. 158 
 
3.2.3. NON-DISCRIMINATION  
The principle of ’non-discrimination’ is an important element of a favourable investment climate. 
At a minimum, non-discrimination permits the investor to operate free of competitive 
disadvantage. In some cases, it may improve the host state’s treatment of covered investments 
or investors because the beneficiary of the protection gains the favourable treatment accorded 
to host-state investors or investors of third countries. That is, the principle multiplies the effect of 
host-state policies favouring a particular investment or investor by requiring the extension of 
these policies to all investments or investors entitled to non-discrimination.159 
Non-discrimination does not prohibit all differences between the treatment of covered 
investment and the treatment of other investments. Such a requirement would eviscerate the 
host state’s legitimate regulatory authority, which necessitates treating differently situated 
investments dissimilarly. For instance, competition policy may require prohibiting the merger of 
two large investments, but not the merger of two much smaller investments.160 
The principle of non-discrimination, therefore, prohibits unreasonable discrimination. 
Discrimination is unreasonable if it is unrelated to a legitimate regulatory interest. For example, 
preferring one investment over another on the ground of nationality is not a legitimate regulatory 
interest.161 
3.2.3.1. Most-Favoured Nation and National Treatment 
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Most BITs include guarantees of national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment for 
investments and investors which full under the jurisdiction of the BITs.162 
The concept of MFN and national treatment assumes that the treatment of covered investments 
shall be compared only to the treatment of comparable investments. National treatment, for 
example, does not require that covered investments be treated as favourably as every 
investment in the host state in every respect. MFN and the national treatment standards must 
be interpreted to require that the treatment of covered investment or investors be evaluated only 
with respect to the treatment of comparable investments or investors. Even where a phrase 
such as ’in like situations’ or ’like circumstances’ does not appear in these provisions, such a 
limitation should be treated as implicit in the provisions.163 
In Feldman v. Mexico 2002,164 the tribunal defined the term ’like circumstances’ to mean 
domestic competitors in the same economic sector, which in Feldman happened to be the 
export of cigarettes. In ADF v. United States 2003,165 identifying the relevant competitor was 
perhaps simpler insofar as the arbitral tribunal assumed that entities in direct competition were 
in like circumstances, in this case American–owned producers of steel were considered to be in 
like circumstances as Canadian-owned producers of steel.166  
Where an MFN provision requires no less favourable treatment and the host state provides 
more favourable treatments to the covered investment than it accords to investment of the other 
nations, the investors of these other nations can be expected to invoke the MFN provision so as 
to elevate the treatment they receive.167 
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The MFN and national treatment provisions are more often subject to exceptions than other 
provision of the BITs. Two exceptions often appear.168  
Firstly, these treatment provisions are commonly subject to an exception for matters of taxation. 
The most common version of this exception provides that the MFN does not apply to any 
advantage granted pursuant to international agreements relating wholly or mainly to taxation.169 
Many countries have concluded international taxation treaties, especially treaties to prevent 
double taxation, and the effect of this formulation of the taxation is to exclude concessions made 
in those treaties from the MFN treatment or, in some cases national treatment, obligations.170   
The second exception commonly found in these provisions is one for advantages granted 
pursuant to an agreement establishing a customs union, free trade area, or other organisation 
for economic integration. As part of their integration into a customs union or free trade area, 
countries often make considerable concessions to other countries in exchange for similarly 
considerable concessions. A BIT party may be unwilling to grant those same concessions to 
any other country unless that country makes the same concessions.171 
 
3.2.4. TRANSPARENCY 
’Transparency’ advances the basic element of the rule of law, i.e. that the laws be known. 
Transparency is necessary for the creation of a rule-based investment regime. It inhibits 
corruption, a classic form of government failure that is the antithesis of the rule of law and that 
has been demonstrated to inhibit investment flows. More generally, the principle of transparency 
improves governance, which in turn promotes development. It may reduce the probability of 
dispute over the interpretation and application of the law.172 
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Despite those advantages of transparency, only a few BITs have included provisions that 
explicitly require transparency. Indeed, the BITs do not appear to have included any explicit 
provision in this regard until the United State concluded its first BITs.173  
A typical formulation requires each party to promote publication or otherwise make publicly 
available certain laws. Most commonly, these are laws that pertain to or affect investments, and, 
in some BITs, these are laws are in respect of matter covered by the BIT or that may affect the 
operation of the BIT. The transparency provisions may apply not only to legislation, but to 
judicial decision and administrative regulation and decisions.174 
 
3.2.5. ACCESS 
 ’Access’ is one of the core principles found in BITs, but the vast majority of BITs provide only a 
very limited right to access.175 
3.2.5.1. Establishment  
There are two basic approaches to admission. In the vast majority of BITs, most of which have 
been concluded by European countries, the issue is dealt with in the general provisions on the 
’encouragement’ and ’promotion’ of investments. In these BITs, the provisions typically envisage 
that each state concerned “shall” admit investments from the other state party. This provision is, 
however, generally qualified by a clause to the effect that the investment shall be admitted in 
accordance with the legislation of the host state. The domestic legislation of the host state may 
well allow for extensive restriction on the admission of foreign investments.  In this larger group 
of BITs, the obligation to admit investments is subject to whatever restrictions on such 
admission that may exist in the law of the host state at the time of the conclusion of the BIT and 
subsequently. 176  Indeed, this fact is acknowledged by the Australia-Egypt BIT, which provides 
that,  
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“Each party shall encourage and promote investment in its territory by investor of the other party 
and shall, in accordance with its laws and investment policies, applicable from time to time, 
admit investment.”177 
The provision has the effect of incorporating local laws with respect to establishment into the 
BIT so that a failure by the host state to adhere to its own law violates the BIT. This would allow 
the investor to seek a remedy through the investor-state dispute provision or the home state to 
seek remedy through the state-state dispute provision.178 
The second principal approach taken towards the question of admission is that found in BITs 
concluded by the United States. Such treaties are relatively small in number. These BITs are 
based on international investment policy aimed at reducing foreign government actions that 
impede or distort investment flows and at developing an international system, based on national 
treatment and most-favoured nation principles, that permits investment flows to respond more 
freely to market forces.179 
In the U.S.A.’s BITs, the national and MFN standards are made applicable to the ’establishment’ 
or ’acquisition’ of investments, or, in other words, to their admission, as well as subsequent 
operation and disposition of the investments.  In contrast, to the European BITs which leave 
investors subject to whatever restriction on admission that may be applied to them by the host 
country, the U.S.A.‘s BITs in principle assure investors covered by the BITs that they will not, in 
comparison with any other investor, enjoy fewer rights in respect of market access.180 
BITs that grant national and MFN treatment with respect to access virtually always reserve for 
each party the right to designate sectors of the economy within which exception to national and 
MFN treatment may be made.181 
3.2.5.2. Performance requirement 
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BITs contain a prohibition on performance requirements. Prohibited performance requirements 
usually are host countries’ restrictions on the use of inputs and outputs by investments. These 
restrictions include local hiring requirements, domestic content requirements, import restrictions, 
technology transfer requirement, and export requirements. BITs provisions that prohibit 
performance requirements most often prohibit only those requirements that are included in an 
exhaustive list and those performance requirements off the list are permitted.182 
Two justifications for the prohibition of performance requirements can easily be mentioned. One 
is that such performance requirements interfere with the investor’s control of the investment 
and, thus, potentially the security of the investment.183 The other justification for such a 
requirement is that they are trade distorting. Since performance requirements often regulate the 
source of use of inputs or the destination of outputs, they restrict international trade.184 
3.2.5.3. Entry and sojourn  
Few BITs have provisions that provide only a very limited right to access for investors or 
persons associated with an investment. A typical provision provides that, in accordance with 
national legislation relating to the entry and sojourn of aliens, individuals working for an investor, 
as well as members of their household, shall be permitted to enter into, remain in, and leave the 
territory of the host state for the purpose of carrying out activities associated with an investment. 
Some treaties limit the provision to persons in a managerial or technical position.185 
3.2.5.4. Employment 
Following the U.S.A.‘s BITs some other countries have incorporated an employment provision 
into their BITs. The most common form of this provision gives an investment the right to hire top 
managerial personnel of its choice regardless of their nationality. The provision, thus, prohibits 
the host state from prescribing the nationality of those who hold certain positions within the 
enterprise. An employment provision is, however, subject to the immigration laws of the host 
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state. The host states, therefore, have some ability to control the nationality of employees by the 
application of their immigration laws.186  
The United States created exceptions to an employment provision. The first exception allows 
host states to require that a majority of the members of the board of directors be of a particular 
nationality, provided that the requirement does not materially impair the ability of the investor to 
exercise control over its investment. Secondly, beginning from 2004, the U.S. BITs allow the 
parties to the treaty to specify exceptions to this provision in an annex to the treaty. A few BITs 
of other states have included these exceptions in their BITs.187 BITs, thus, can contain a 
provision which gives the right to access not only for the investor but also for any top managerial 
personnel which the investor chooses to employ. 
 
3.2.6. DUE PROCESS                                                                                                            
The settlement of an investment dispute is a matter specifically addressed by BITs. In order to 
avoid legal insecurity and political conflict, and with a view to providing for a predetermined 
forum of the direct application of the treaty in case of disputes, so as to promote a generally 
favourable climate for covered investments, BITs include a dispute settlement provision.188 
 BITs generally provide for two different types of dispute settlement procedures, for inter-state 
dispute and for host state foreign investor dispute.189 Indeed, the investor-state dispute 
settlement provision is the principal way in which the BITs represent an advance in promoting 
the rule of law, in creating a liberal investment regime and in providing a favourable investment 
climate comparative to the post-war FNCs.190 
Arbitration clauses typically contain an offer of the host state to submit to investor-state 
arbitration in case of a dispute arising out of an investment. This gives the foreign investor an 
effective and reliable mechanism to enforce claims against the host state, insulating them from 
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the possible deficiencies of the local judicial system.  Arbitration has also played a decisive role 
in de-politicising disputes arising from investment. The ICSID tribunal, in SDG v. Argentina,191 
stated that the dispute settlement provision offered to investors the assurance that any dispute 
that might flow from their investment would not be subject to the perceived hazards of delays 
and political pressure of adjudication in national courts.192 
Investor-state arbitration clauses were not a feature of the BIT until the conclusion, in 1965, of 
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dispute between State and Nationals of other 
State. After this ICSID Convention had entered into force, contracting parties to a BIT began 
gradually to provide for investor-state arbitration in their BITs, beginning with a 1968 BIT 
between the Netherlands and Indonesia.193 
3.2.6.1. Investor-State Dispute Resolution 
Investor-state arbitration clauses are among the most fundamental and typical provisions of 
BITs. They provide substantial innovation in respect of classic international law in affording 
individual investors the right to pursue claims against a foreign state in direct arbitration under 
an international treaty by application of both domestic and international law.194 
3.2.6.1.1. Consent to Arbitration 
While the host state’s consent to arbitration typically is given in the BIT itself, the common 
practice is that the foreign investor consents by submitting a claim to arbitration. Some BITs, 
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however, provide that the investor may consent in writing to arbitration, after which either party 
may submit the dispute to arbitration.195 
3.2.6.1.2. Arbitration Mechanisms 
The most common means of arbitration to which a host country consents is arbitration 
administrated by ICSID under the ICSID arbitration rules. Most of the earliest investor-state 
arbitration provisions included the parties’ consent to this single method of arbitration only. By 
the 1980s, some host states began to negotiate BITs that provided investors with other means 
of dispute resolution, and this practice became common in the 1990s. To date the greater 
majority of investor-state arbitrations, however, have been before the ICSID.196 
The most common alternative to ICSID arbitration is arbitration brought under the rules of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The rules of arbitration 
under UNCITRAL differ from ICSID arbitration in that the former does not provide an institution 
to administer the arbitration. For this reason, UNCITRAL arbitration is described as ad hoc 
arbitration, meaning that a tribunal, support staff, and appropriate facilities must be assembled 
for each case.197 
The next most common alternative to ICSID arbitration is arbitration before the ICSID Additional 
Facility. The Additional Facility was created by ICSID in 1978 to arbitrate disputes that are 
outside the scope of the jurisdiction of the ICSID.198 
Other arbitral mechanisms, sometimes arises in the parties’ consent to arbitration. The most 
common is arbitration before the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce of the International 
Chamber of Commerce. Other alternatives are used only occasionally in investor-state 
arbitrations. A few BITs provide for the creation of an ad hoc arbitral tribunal without reference 
to any specific set of rules.199 
3.2.6.1.3. Prerequisite to Arbitration 
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Many BITs require the disputing parties, prior to submitting the dispute to arbitration, to seek to 
resolve the dispute through negotiation. No arbitral tribunal, however, has yet declined 
jurisdiction because the parties failed to seek a negotiated settlement. A negotiated settlement 
cannot be compelled and, if either party does not wish to negotiate, little is achieved by requiring 
the parties to engage in futile and purely formal negotiations.200  
BITs regarded investment arbitration as an alternative rather than as a subsidiary means of 
adjudication. As a result, most of the BITs do not require investors to exhaust local remedies as 
a condition for acceeding to international arbitration. BITs, however, have been using different 
approaches in this regard. Most BITs even do not include a provision on exhaustion of local 
remedies. A few BITs concluded since 1995 explicitly obliged the parties not to request the 
investor to exhaust local remedies. For example, Article 10 of the BITs between Austria and the 
United Arab Emirate of 2001 shows this approach.201  
3.2.6.1.4. Choice of Law Clause 
The investor-state arbitration clause sometimes includes a choice of law clause. Foreign 
investors generally prefer to have international law apply to any dispute, because international 
law often provides greater protection for investment than national law and because the host 
state can alter national law to the detriment of the investor. On the other hand, host states for 
the same reasons generally prefer that national law be applied.202 
BITs generally do not designate local laws as governing law, although individual substantive 
provisions are sometimes subordinate to domestic law. A choice of law clause in a BIT is, thus, 
likely to specify either that international law applies or that both international law and domestic 
law apply. Some BITs provide that investment shall receive treatment not less favourable than 
that required by international law, a provision that effectively requires the application of 
international law in order to ensure that the investment receives the required treatment. 
International law addresses only a limited range of issues and, of course, investment located in 
the host state is subject to its law in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.  Even where 
international law is designated as the applicable law, therefore, national law may be applicable 
                                                          
200
 Idem at 439. 
201
UNCTAD, Bilateral investment treaties 1995–2006: trends in investment rulemaking 2007 108 
unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf Accessed on 2014-12-22.  
202
 Vandevelde, KJ Bilateral investment treaties: history, policy, and interpretation 2010 444. 
 
 
54 
 
to the extent that it is consistent with international law. Consequently, irrespective of the 
presence of a choice of law clause or the language of the clause, the situation that nearly 
always exists in investor-state arbitration is that international law, including, in particular, the 
provision of the BIT applies where it exists, while national law applies to the extent that it is not 
inconsistent with, or displaced by, international law.203  
Where the dispute is submitted to the ICSID, arbitration is governed by Article 42 of the ICSID 
Convention, which states that, lacking agreements between the disputing parties with respect to 
the choice of law, the tribunal shall apply the law of the host state and any applicable rules of 
international law.  Article 42 of the ICSID Convention is, thus, consistent with the practice of 
tribunals not subject to the ICSID Convention.204 
3.2.6.1.5. Awards  
Many BITs provide that any award under the investor-state disputes provision shall be final and 
obligatory. This clause makes it clear that an award is res judicata and not subject to appeal. 
The clause also obligates the host state to comply with the award.  If the host state failed to 
comply with the award, it would give rise to a claim under the state-state dispute provision.205 
Investor–state arbitral awards are not subject to appeal, but awards issued by ICSID tribunals 
are subject to an annulment proceeding. Awards that are not governed by the ICSID Convention 
may be subject to review under the arbitration law of the state where the arbitration takes 
place.206 
Some BITs include clauses to facilitate the enforcement of arbitral awards. ICSID awards are 
enforceable under the ICSID Convention in the territory of any state party to that convention. 
The ICSID Convention, however, does not require enforcement of any awards issued by any 
other mechanism. Awards issued as a result of arbitration before the additional facility, under 
the UNCITRAL Rules, or through some other mechanism may, therefore, be enforced through 
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the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
also known as the New York Convention.207 208 
 
3.3. ETHIOPIAN INVESTMENT LAW 
In Ethiopia, the Civil Code and the Commercial Code serve as general frameworks for business 
activities. Within this broad framework, there are specific investment laws regulating 
investments. The investment laws have passed through various amendments and revisions with 
a view to creating a legal structure conducive to attracting foreign direct investment.209 
The relevant laws currently in force in Ethiopia are: Investment Proclamation No. 769/2012; 
Investment (Amendment) Proclamation No. 849/2014; Investment Incentive and Investment 
Areas Reserved for Domestic Investors Council of Ministers Regulations No. 270/2012; and 
Investment Incentive and Investment Areas Reserved for Domestic Investors Council of 
Ministers (Amendment) Regulations No. 312/2014. 
 
3.3.1. INVESTMENT PROCLAMATION NO 769/2012 
The Investment Proclamation No 769/2012 (hereinafter called the Investment Proclamation) has 
nine parts and 41 Articles. Part One deals with the short title and states that this proclamation 
may be cited as the ’Investment Proclamation No. 769/2012’. It provides definitions of what 
Investment, Enterprise, Capital, Investor, and the like are to mean in the context of the 
proclamation and the scope of application of the proclamation which states that the provision of 
this proclamation shall not be applicable to investments in the prospecting, exploration and 
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development of minerals and petroleum resources. Article 4 provides for the organs that have 
jurisdiction in the administration of investments. 210 
Part Two deals with investment objectives and areas of investment. Article 5 states that the 
investment objectives of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia are designed to improve 
the living standards of the peoples of Ethiopia through the realisation of sustainable economic 
and social development. It then lists the details of those objectives.211 
Articles 6-9 deal with areas of investments. Article 6 provides an exclusive list of areas of 
investment reserved for the government or joint investment with the government. Article 7 and 8 
provide that areas  of  investment  exclusively  reserved  for domestic investors or areas  of  
investment  open  for  foreign  investors shall be determined by regulation to be issued by the 
Council of Ministers.212  
Part Three deals with forms of investment and capital requirements for foreign investors, Part 
Four deals with investment permits,  and  Part Five deals with the registration of technology 
transfer and collaboration agreements with domestic investors.213 
 
Part Six deals with investment incentives, guarantees, and protection. Article 23 provides that 
areas of investment specified by regulation to be issued by the Council of Ministers pursuant to 
the investment objectives stated under Article 5 of this Proclamation shall be eligible for 
investment incentives. 214  
Article 25 deals with investment guarantees and protection. It provides as follows: 
 
“1) No investment may be expropriated or nationalised except when required by the public 
interest and then only in conformity with the requirements of the law; and 
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2) Adequate compensation, corresponding to the prevailing market value, shall be paid in 
advance in case of expropriation or nationalisation of an investment for public interest….”215 
 
Article 26 deals with the remittance of funds. Article 26 (1) provides that any foreign investor 
shall have the right, in respect of his approved investment, to make remittances out of Ethiopia 
in convertible foreign currency at the prevailing rate of exchange on the date of remittance, and 
it then lists the remittances that are allowed.216 
 
Part Seven deals with investment administration. It covers areas such as investment 
administration organs, power, and the duties of the agency (now the ’commission’ as amended 
in the Investment [Amendment] Proclamation 849/2014), the power and duties of the investment 
board, one-stop shop service, and others.217  
 
Part Eight deals  with the  industrial development zone, and it states that, in order  for  the  
industrial  sector  to  have  a leading role in the economy of the country, the federal  government  
shall  establish  industrial development zones.218 
 
The final part, Part Nine, has miscellaneous provisions. In this part, among other Articles, Article 
37provides as follows: 
 
“1/ Any  investor  may  employ  duly  qualified expatriate  experts  required  for  the operation of 
his business; 
2/ An  investor  who  employs  expatriates,  pursuant  to  sub-article  (1)  of  this  Article,  shall 
be responsible for replacing, within a  limited  period,  such  expatriate  personnel  by  
Ethiopians  by  arranging  the  necessary  training thereof; and 
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3/ Notwithstanding the provisions of sub article (1) and (2) of this Article, a foreign  investor 
shall, without any restriction, have the right  to  employ  expatriate  employees on  top 
management  positions  for  his enterprise.”219 
 
Article 38 requires that any investor shall have the obligation to observe the law of the country in 
carrying out his investment activities. In particular, he shall give due regard to environmental 
protection.220 
 
The Investment Proclamation has been amended by the Investment (Amendment) Proclamation 
No. 849/2014. This Investment (Amendment) Proclamation has introduced eight amendments to 
the Investment Proclamation No. 769/2012. But these amendments do not affect my work so I 
will not deal will them, except that, in this Investment (Amendment) Proclamation, Article 2(2) 
provides that any reference to the ’Agency’ appearing anywhere in the proclamation is deleted 
and replaced by the ’Commission’.221 
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
ANALYSIS   
BITs are important instruments of protection to foreign investors, for whom there is currently not 
much legal alternative.222 Although Ethiopia has a strong Investment Proclamation, since it has 
incorporated most of the significant provisions that are found in BITs, the conclusion of BITs has 
a greater role in the protection of investment and the attraction of more investors to Ethiopia.  
The greater importance of BITs is due to the possibility that, although Ethiopia could incorporate 
the substance of BIT obligation in its domestic legislation and thereby offer precisely the same 
protections without concluding a BIT, any such legislation may be subject to amendment.  
Investors cannot, therefore, rely upon the continued existence of any protections that the 
legislation provides. A BIT brings greater security and transparency to the investment climate 
than could be achieved by the investment proclamation.223  
Secondly, as stated in Chapter Two, BIT consists of more investment protection provisions than 
are provided in the Investment Proclamation.224  
 Those protections are summarised below in order to show the role BITs play in securing 
investment in Ethiopia.  
To begin with, FET standards require a host state to accord an absolute degree of protection to 
foreign investors, notwithstanding the changes in the host state’s law or its protection lapses 
with respect to the treatment of its own national companies.225 
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The requirement of full protection and security requires the host state to exercise due 
conscientiousness or reasonable care to prevent injury to the property (and person) of foreign 
nationals.226  
Observance of the obligation provision ensures that agreements reached by the host state and 
their investors are enforceable through the investor-state and state-state disputes provisions.227 
BIT expropriation provisions at all times acknowledge the power of the host state to expropriate 
covered investment, but they impose conditions on the application of that power. The 
requirement of compensation, in most case, is the payment of prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation.228 
BITs most commonly provide that the national and MFN treatment standard applies to the 
compensation for losses of a party’s investment owing to armed conflict, civil strife, or a natural 
disaster. Based on the national and MFN treatment standard, therefore, even though the host 
state has no obligation to compensate an investor for such loss, the investor will have the right 
to compensation if the host state compensates either its national investors or investors from 
third-countries.229 
BITs guarantee the right of free transfer of payments for the investor in connection with his 
investment. In most BITs, similar to that provided in the Germany Model BIT of 2009, the right of 
transfer includes, capital, return, and, in the case of liquidation, the proceeds from liquidation, 
the principal and additional amounts to maintain or increase the investment, the payment of 
loans, the proceeds of sale of the whole or any part of the investment, and the compensation 
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paid under the treaty’s provision on full protection and security, expropriation, and compensation 
for losses.230  
Most BITs, including the U.S.A. Model BIT of 2012, contain national and MFN treatments. The 
national and MFN treatments require that each party accord to investors and their investment 
treatment not less favourable than that accorded, in like circumstances, to investors and 
investment of the host state (national treatment) or to investors or investment of other countries 
(MFN treatment).231 The national and MFN treatment, however, will apply only where the foreign 
and domestic investor or investor of other countries are in an ’identical’ or ’similar’ situation, or 
’in like circumstances’.232 
Few BITs have provisions that generally seek to promote transparency in the legal framework 
governing investment. In this regard, the U.S.A. Model BIT of 2012 Article 10(1) can be 
mentioned. This Article requires each party to promptly publish, or otherwise make publicly 
available, its laws, regulations, procedures, administration ruling of general application, and 
adjudicatory decisions respecting any matter covered by this treaty.233  Another similar provision 
is found in the Austria Model BIT of 2008 which contains a general transparency clause relating 
to the public availability of domestic law (as well as treaty law) that may affect the operation of 
the BIT.234 
The majority of BITs retain the traditional approach which leaves the admission of investment to 
the discretion of the host state.235 Such European BITs generally stipulate that the host state will 
admit investment in accordance with its legislation.236 Those treaties do not, therefore, impose a 
duty to admit foreign investments.237 This means that each contracting party retains full 
discretion on the issue of establishing investments and does not make any undertaking in this 
                                                          
230
 Idem at 312.   
231
 Idem at 775.   
232
 Dolzer, R and Stevens, M Bilateral investment treaties 1995 63.  
233
 Brown, C Commentaries on selected model investment treaties 2013 801. 
234
 Idem at 30. 
235
 Idem at 24. 
236
 Dolzer, R and Stevens, M Bilateral investment treaties 1995 49.  
237
 Brown, C Commentaries on selected model investment treaties 2013 24. 
 
 
62 
 
regard.238 In the second group of BITs, we found the US BITs. The US BITs require the better of 
either the national or most-favoured nation treatment, not only in respect of post-establishment 
investments but also in respect of initial establishment. This is based on free market theories 
and the assumption that there is no rational economic justification for restrictive admission 
mechanisms.239 For instance, the Korea-Japan BIT of 2002, similar to the U.S.A. Model BIT, 
accords national and most-favoured nation treatment to investors of the other contracting party 
with respect to the establishment, acquisition, and expansion of investment.240  
A few BITs contain a prohibition on performance requirements. Justifications for the prohibition 
of performance requirements are that the requirement interferes with the investor’s control of the 
investment and that such prohibitions are trade distorting.241 
Some BITs provide for a very limited right of access for investors or persons associated with an 
investment.242 Employment provision guarantees an investment the right to hire top managerial 
personnel of its choice, regardless of nationality. The provision, thus, prohibits the host state 
from prescribing the nationality of those who hold certain positions within the enterprise.243  
Host state foreign investor arbitration clauses are among the fundamental and typical provisions 
of BITs. They afford private parties the right to pursue claims against a host state in direct 
arbitration under an international treaty by application of both domestic and international law.244  
In some BITs, the host state foreign investor arbitration clauses include a choice of law clause. 
It is obvious that foreign investors generally prefer to have international law apply to any dispute 
because international law often provides greater protection for investment than national law and 
because the host state can alter national law to the detriment of the investor.245 
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A BIT is likely to specify either that international law applies or that both international law and 
local law apply.  Even if international law is designated as the only applicable law, however, 
national law may be applicable to the extent that it is consistent with international counterparts 
since international law may not cover all issues that may arise in an investment dispute. 246 
 In addition, many BITs provide that any award under the investor-state disputes provision shall 
be final and binding.247 Some BITs even include clauses to facilitate the enforcement of awards. 
ICSID awards are enforceable under the ICSID Convention in the territory of any member 
countries to that convention. Awards issued as a result of arbitration before the Additional 
Facility, under the UNCITRAL Rules or through some other mechanism, may be enforced 
through the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New 
York Convention).248 
As was shown in Chapter Two, Ethiopia has a good Investment Proclamation. For instance, 
Investment Proclamation No 769/2012 provides that areas of investment open for foreign 
investors are to be determined by regulation to be issued by the Council of Ministers (Article 8), 
and any foreign investor is entitled to the right to make remittances out of Ethiopia in convertible 
foreign currency, as per Article 26/1. According to Article 25/1, no investment may be 
expropriated or nationalised except when required in consideration of the public interest and 
only in compliance with the requirements of the law.  Adequate compensation, corresponding to 
the prevailing market value, is to be paid in advance in the case of expropriation or 
nationalisation of an investment for public interest (subparagraph 2). Furthermore, the investor 
is allowed to make a remittance of compensation due as a result of expropriation (subparagraph 
26/g).249 
As discussed above, firstly, the greater importance of BITs is due to the possibility that, although 
the substance of a BIT obligation could be incorporated into domestic legislation, such 
legislation may be subject to amendment. Investors cannot, therefore, rely on the continued 
existence of any protection that the legislation provides.  BIT brings a greater security and 
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transparency to the investment climate than could be achieved by the Investment 
Proclamation.250  
Secondly, BITs have detailed provisions which are not found in the Investment Proclamations 
such as FET; full protection and security requires, the observance of obligation provisions 
relating to war and civil disturbance, national treatment, and most-favoured nation treatment, 
transparency, prohibition of performance requirements, entry and sojourn, and host state foreign 
investors arbitration, (which is the most important of all). The host state foreign investors’ 
arbitration includes a choice of clauses.251 BITs provide that any award under the investor-state 
disputes provision shall be final and binding and they include clauses to facilitate the 
enforcement of awards.252 
Specifically the clause providing for host state foreign investors arbitration is among the 
fundamental and typical provisions of BITs because they affording private parties the right to 
pursue claims against a foreign state in direct arbitration under an international treaty by the 
application both of domestic and international law.253 
Thirdly, even if such provisions of BITs are found in the Investment Proclamation, BITs have 
more detailed provisions. In this regard, the provisions on expropriation, admission, remittance 
of found, and employment provisions are worthy of mentioning. 
Finally, according to a study by Neumayer and Spess, BITs fulfil their purpose, that is they 
attract more foreign direct investment to the signatory states.  And those developing countries 
that have signed more BITs with major capital exporting developed countries are likely to have 
received more FDI.254 BITs, therefore, not only secure investment but also can attract more 
investment from developed countries to developing countries.  BTIs concluded by Ethiopia do 
not only benefit foreign investors but also benefit Ethiopia by attracting more investment from 
developed countries. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION and RECOMMENDATIONS  
BITs may cover FDI, portfolio investment, and other personal investments from abroad, such as 
ownership of real estate. FDI is, however, the main object of BITs.255  Up to now Ethiopia has 
signed 30 bilateral investments, with countries like China (May 11, 1998) and India (June 5, 
2005).256 Ethiopia is also one of the 49 countries that are currently designated by the United 
Nations as least developed countries (LDCs).257  
Developing as well as developed countries need to attract FDI owing to the advantages that it 
offers for growth and development, especially for   developing countries, the majority of which 
function in a low savings rate which is followed by a low investment rate resulting in low per-
capita income growth rate. FDI may help them to avoid an unnecessary economic situation.258 A 
country is in unnecessary economic situation, when it is in a budget deficit i.e. when the 
government’s expenditures are greater than its revenues.259  
FDI is a dynamic force of globalisation and a decisive element of economic growth which 
provides numerous benefits to the host countries. FDI provides capital, foreign exchange, 
technology, competition, and increased access to foreign markets, to mention just a few 
advantages. It is the most important source of the external flow of resources to the developing 
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countries. Thus, FDI has played a vital role in the economic growth in developing countries by 
generating more benefits to the host economies rather than only filling the short-term capital 
deficiency problems.260  
According to the World Investment Report, global FDI flows rose by 9 per cent in 2013 to $1.45 
trillion, up from $1.33 trillion in 2012.261 Taking East Africa in particular, FDI increased by 15 per 
cent to $6.2 billion as a result of rising flows to Ethiopia and Kenya. Ethiopia’s industrial policy is 
attracting Asian capital to develop its manufacturing base.262  
Some large greenfield projects highlight the success of Ethiopia in attracting FDI, thereby 
enhancing its productive capabilities and generating employment. For example, Xinxiang 
Kuroda (China) invested $67 million in a project in the textiles industry, creating about 1,100 
jobs. An Indian-funded project in the food industry, also, is expected to create about 340 jobs.263 
 
As I have tried to show in the preceding Chapters, BITs offer foreign investors great protection 
by providing a mechanism through which a foreign investor and a host country can establish a 
contract that is binding under international law. In addition, the investor-state dispute settlement 
procedures offer investors a neutral forum in which they can be heard equally with the host state 
and whose decisions bind the host state. The other provisions of BITs is that they also offer 
substantive protections such as national treatment, most favoured nation treatment, free 
transfer of assets, and a prohibition on performance requirements and prompt, adequate, and 
effective compensation for expropriation.264 
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The time inconsistency problem is a significant barrier to efficient foreign direct investment. This 
is due to fact that a sovereign state is not able, to credibly bind itself to a particular set of legal 
rules when it negotiates with a foreign investor. Regardless of the assurances that the host state 
gives to the foreign investor and regardless of its intentions at the time of the contract, the host 
state can later change those rules if it feels that the existing rules are less favourable to its 
interests than they could be. Domestic laws, which are critical to the credibility of contractual 
promises among private parties, are no longer adequate to ensure compliance with the initial 
agreement in international investment contracts.265  
Thus, as the foreign investor cannot rely on domestic laws to protect its interests, the only 
alternative legal structure is international law. International law, however, does not provide a 
way for a host country to make credible and binding commitments to an investor. The 
mechanisms of enforcing   of an investment contract, in international law, also do not exist. This 
is to say that contracts with a host, by itself, do not offer a foreign investor any additional 
protections under international law. Assuming, furthermore, that protection exists, the investor 
cannot be sure that it will be enforced by an arbitral tribunal or that the host will accept the 
decision of a tribunal if the investor obtains a favourable ruling.266  
By signing a BIT, however, the host country agrees, in a binding treaty under international law, 
to refrain from expropriation and to respect any contracts that it signs with investors. Not 
respecting such a contract is a violation of the treaty and, thus, a violation of international law 
that can be remedied through international commercial arbitration. Developing countries have 
an incentive to sign a BIT since such a treaty helps them to attract foreign investment. 267 
The binding effect of the contractual arrangement which is made possible by the dispute 
settlement provision of BITs268  allows the parties to avoid the dynamic inconsistency problem. 
The existence of a neutral dispute settlement mechanism that is capable of ensuring 
compliance by the host helps ensure that host states will honour their agreements. Thus, 
subject only to transaction costs, a BIT regime will cause capital to be invested where it stands 
to earn the greatest return.269 
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In concluding, I argue that it is advisable for Ethiopia to conclude more BITs.  Being one of the 
least developed,270  Ethiopia needs FDI for its economic growth.271 Even though, FDI inflow to 
Ethiopia is increasing,272 signing of BITs will help Ethiopia to attract more foreign direct 
investment inflow than there is now. This is due to the fact that BITs will give the contract 
between an investor and Ethiopian government an international standing, and because BITs will 
provide more detailed investment protections than those are provided by Ethiopian Investment 
Proclamation. BITs also will allow any contracting foreign investor, whose country is party to the 
treaty, to submit any case that may arise from the investment contract to a neutral international 
dispute settlement tribunal provided in the BITs, whose decision will be binding on Ethiopia. 
Ethiopian BITs, thus, will offer great protection to any foreign investor who needs to invest in 
Ethiopia, and,273 thereby, attract more foreign direct investment to Ethiopia.274 My 
recommendations are presented in greater detail below. 
 
My recommendations are that, when Ethiopia enters into BITs, it should try to give consideration 
to the following issues. Firstly, the exact meaning of most of the standards in BITs is 
controversial, apparently as a result of the vagueness of these standards.275  Three examples 
will suffice to show this defect of BITs. The first is that the exact meaning of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard is divisive. There is ongoing debate over whether the fair and 
equitable treatment standard merely reflects the protection offered through CIL or whether it 
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constitutes an autonomous standard on its own that goes beyond the minimum standard in 
international law. Arbitral tribunals are showing a tendency to treat the fair and equitable 
standard as an autonomous standard whose interpretation depends on the treaty context.276  
Some Ethiopian BITs did not have a clear definition or explanation of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard. For example, in the Ethiopian BIT with China277 the fair and equitable 
treatment standard is stated without any explanation. In the Ethiopia-China BIT, Article 3 states 
that investments and activities associated with investments of investors of either contracting 
party shall be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy protection in the territory of 
the other contracting party. 278  Ethiopian BITs must, therefore, define the fair and equitable 
standard and also follow the arbitral decisions and treat the fair and equitable standard as an 
autonomous standard.279  
The second relates to the currency transfer of the BITs which typically provides that each party 
shall permit the free transfer of certain payments related to an investment.280  Even though, 
most Ethiopian BITs had provided an illustrative list of transfers or payments to which the 
transfer provision applies, the Ethiopia-Israel BIT 281 and the Ethiopia-United Kingdom BIT282 did 
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not have this illustrative list. For example, in the Ethiopia-Israel BIT, Article 6 simply states that 
each contracting party shall guarantee to investors of the other contracting party the rights of 
unrestricted transfer of their investments and returns.283  Ethiopian BITs must, therefore, identify 
the transfers to which it applies and define what is meant by transferability.284 
The third standard is in the requirement that expropriation be accompanied by compensation. 
Even though, most Ethiopian BITs had adopted as a condition for expropriation the traditional 
Hull rule of the ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ formula.285  Few Ethiopian BITs, however, had 
used more general terms to refer to the requirement of compensation when expropriation or 
nationalisation takes place. For example, in the Ethiopia- Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union 
BIT Article 7/2/c provided that the measures of expropriation shall be accompanied by 
provisions for the payment of adequate and effective compensation. And  sub-section 3 of this 
Article states that payment shall be made without undue delay.286 Similarly, in the Ethiopia-
China BIT, Article 4/2 provided that the compensation shall be equivalent to the value of the 
expropriated investments at the time when expropriation is proclaimed, be convertible and freely 
transferable and shall be paid without unreasonable delay.287 Ethiopian BITs, therefore, should 
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promote the principle that ’prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation should be paid.  And 
they should  define in detail what  is meant  by the ’prompt, adequate and effective’ 
requirement.288 Ethiopia must, therefore, try to define the BITs treatment standards very 
specifically in order to avoid legal insecurity. 
 
Secondly, there are BIT protections that may be found in only few BITs, but which are of 
significant importance. For example, the transparency provision is found in only a few BITs, 289 
and a small number of BITs contain provisions on prohibition on performance requirements290 
and a very limited right to access for investors or persons associated with an investment.291  In 
Ethiopia, only  the  BITs with Austria,292 Kuwait293, and Finland294 had included an explicit 
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provision that  requires transparency. For example, in the Ethiopia-Finland BIT, Article 15 states 
that each contracting party shall promptly publish, or otherwise make publicly available, its laws, 
regulations, procedures and administrative rulings and judicial decisions of general application 
as well as international agreements which may affect the investments of investors of the other 
contracting party in the territory of the former contracting party.295  
 
Only few Ethiopian BITs have provisions on prohibition on performance requirement. For 
example,  in the Ethiopia-Kuwait BIT, Article 3/5 prohibited contracting parties from imposing 
mandatory measures which may require or restrict the purchase of materials, fuel, or of means 
of production, transport or operation of any kind, or restrict the marketing of products  inside or 
outside its territory, or any other measures having the effect of discrimination against 
investments by investors of the other contracting party in favour of investments by its own 
investors or by investors of third states.  Subsection  6 of this Article states that, once  
established, investments shall not be subject in the host contracting state to additional 
performance requirements which may hinder or restrict their use, enjoyment, management, 
maintenance, expansion or other activities in connection with such investments or adversely 
affect or be determinant to their viability.296    
And most Ethiopian BITs did not have provisions that provide a right to access for investors or 
persons associated with an in investment. Among the few BITs that had included provisions in 
this regard only the Ethiopian BIT with Kuwait had provided a detailed provision. In the  
Ethiopia-Kuwait BIT, Article  2/5 states that investors of either contracting states shall be 
permitted to engage top managerial and technical personnel of their choice regardless of 
nationality, and each contracting state shall in this respect make available all necessary facilities 
to the extent permitted by its laws and regulations. And each contracting state shall, subject to 
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its laws and regulations to entry, stay and work of a natural person, examine in good faith and 
give sympathetic consideration to requests by investors of the other contracting state and key 
personnel who are employed by such investors including family members, to enter, leave and 
remain temporarily in its territory for the purpose of carrying out activities connected with the 
making or the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of an investment.297 
Ethiopia, therefore, must give due consideration to such provisions, because their inclusion 
plays a great role in attracting foreign investment.  
Thirdly, some BITs’ provisions can be preferred to others. For example, in the treaties 
concluded by European countries, the issue of admission of foreign investors is subject to 
domestic law298  while in those BITs concluded by the U.S.A., the national and MFN standard 
are made applicable to the ’establishment’ or ’acquisition’ of investments.299 Except for  the BITs 
concluded with Finland300 and Kuwait301, Ethiopian BITs had followed the structure of the BITs 
concluded by European countries and left the issue of admission of investors or investments of 
investors of the other contracting parties to the discretion of the host state.302 In the BITs 
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concluded with Finland303  and Kuwait304, however, the Ethiopian government had followed the 
structure of the BITs concluded by the U.S.A. 305 to some extent since those  BITs concluded 
with Finland and Kuwait had only made provision for  the most favoured nation standard for 
admission of investments of investors of the other contracting parties. But they  had not included 
a national treatment standard. For example, in the Ethiopia-Finland BIT, Article 3/2 provided that 
contracting parties shall apply to investors and to investments by investors of the other 
contracting party upon admission, a treatment which is no less favourable than that accorded to 
investors and to investments of any third state.306 Therefore, Ethiopia has to try to make its BITs 
more liberal. I, thus, recommend that Ethiopia  follows the model adopted by the U.S.A. and 
includes in its BITs the national and most-favoured nation treatment standard with regard to 
admission of investment. This will make Ethiopian’s BITs more liberal and more investment 
friendly. 
Finally, with regard to investor-state dispute provision, most Ethiopian BITs did not have a 
choice of law clause. And only the BITs with Austria307 and Kuwait308 had included a choice of 
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law clause. In the Ethiopia-Austria BIT, Article 15 states that a tribunal established under this 
part (part 9 which deals with settlement of disputes between an investor and a contracting party) 
shall decide the dispute in accordance with this Agreement (the Ethiopia-Austria BIT), and 
applicable rules and principles of international law. 309 The Ethiopia-Kuwait BIT, Article 9/7 also 
provided that an arbitral tribunal shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with such rules 
of law as may be agreed by the parties to the dispute. In the absence of such agreement, it shall 
apply the law of the host state, including its rules on conflict of laws, and such recognised rules 
of international law as may be applicable, taking  into consideration also the relevant provisions 
of this agreement.310 I, thus, recommend that Ethiopian BITs should include a choice of law 
clause, and that choice of law should be international law because investors generally prefer to 
have international law apply to any dispute since international law often provides greater 
protection for investment than national law, in view of the fact that the host state can alter 
national law to the detriment of the investor.311  
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